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ABSTRACT
A dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy is presented where agents may
choose the frequency of price changes. A fixed exchange rate is compared to inflation targeting and
money targeting. A fixed rate generates more price flexibility than the other regimes when the
expenditure switching effect is relatively weak, while money targeting generates more flexibility
when the expenditure switching effect is strong. These endogenous changes in price flexibility can
lead to changes in the welfare performance of regimes. But, for the model calibration considered
here, the extra price flexibility generated by a peg does not compensate for the loss of monetary
independence. Inflation targeting yields the highest welfare level despite generating the least price
flexibility of the three regimes considered.
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Recently an extensive literature has developed which analyses the welfare perfor-
mance of exchange rate regimes in general equilibrium models with sticky-prices
(see Devereux and Engel (1998, 2003), Devereux (2000, 2004) and Bachetta and van
Wincoop (2000)). This new literature is largely based on models where the degree
of price ﬂexibility is exogenously determined and does not change in response to
changes in the monetary regime. The welfare comparisons presented in this litera-
ture are therefore potentially subject to a form of the Lucas (1976) critique. The
Lucas critique suggests that it is implausible that the degree of price ﬂexibility re-
mains unaﬀected if a change in monetary regime produces a large change in the
volatility of output or other important macro variables. There are therefore strong
theoretical reasons to investigate the endogenous determination of price ﬂexibility.
In addition to this theoretical motivation for considering endogenous price ﬂexi-
bility, there is a further motivation arising from the policy debate on the choice of
monetary regime. It has been argued, for instance, that monetary union in Europe
will encourage greater price ﬂexibility which will partly (or completely) oﬀset the
loss of monetary independence. This argument can not be addressed within the
theoretical structure adopted in most of the current literature.
The proposition that the degree of price ﬂexibility changes endogenously with
changes in the monetary policy regime has received some empirical support. Alo-
goskouﬁs and Smith (1991), for instance, present estimates of Phillips-curve equa-
tions which strongly suggest that changes of the exchange rate regime have resulted
in large changes in the degree of inﬂation inertia. They show that inﬂation rates in
the United States and the United Kingdom became signiﬁcantly more sluggish in
response to shocks after the collapse of the Gold Standard and also after the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system. This evidence indicates that the endogeneity of price
ﬂexibility may be an important empirical phenomenon.
This paper uses a sticky-price general equilibrium model of a small open economy
to analyse the welfare implications of ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates. The model
departs from much of the recent literature by allowing the degree of price ﬂexibility
to be determined endogenously. The home country is subject to stochastic shocks
from internal and external sources and the focus of interest is on the stabilisation
and welfare implications of regime choice for the home country. Price setting is sub-
ject to Calvo-style price contracts but, unlike the standard Calvo (1983) structure,
agents are allowed to choose the average frequency of price changes. Agents must
balance the beneﬁts of price ﬂexibility against the costs involved in changing prices.
Since the beneﬁts of price ﬂexibility depend in large part on the volatility of the
macroeconomic environment, the optimally chosen degree of price ﬂexibility diﬀers
between exchange rate regimes. The model is used to analyse the stabilising proper-
ties of each regime and to carry out a welfare comparison between ﬁxed and ﬂoating
exchange rates.
The existing literature on exchange rate regime choice has shown that the relative
welfare eﬀects of policy regimes are subject to many and varied factors. It is not the
1purpose of this paper to recount this literature, nor is it to provide a deﬁnitive welfare
analysis of exchange-rate regime choice. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
simple model of endogenous price ﬂexibility which is a direct development of the
standard framework used in the current literature. This model is used to address
two questions: First, in general, can endogenising price ﬂexibility lead to a change
in the welfare ranking of monetary policy regimes? Second, more speciﬁcally, can a
ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m eg e n e r a t es u ﬃcient price ﬂexibility to compensate for the
loss of monetary independence implied by the ﬁxed rate? The analysis presented
below suggests that the answer to the ﬁrst question is ‘yes’, it is possible to identify
cases where the ranking of monetary regimes is reversed when compared to the
case where price ﬂexibility is exogenous. On the other hand, the results suggest
that the answer to the second question is mixed. A ﬁx e dr a t ed o e sl e a dt og r e a t e r
price ﬂexibility, but this tends to reduce the level of welfare yielded by a ﬁxed rate
(relative to the exogenous price ﬂexibility case).
There have been a number of papers that have previously analysed the impli-
cations of price ﬂexibility in general and endogenous price ﬂexibility in particular.
De Long and Summers (1986) investigate whether increased price and wage ﬂexi-
bility stabilises or destabilises macro variables. They show that increased price and
wage ﬂexibility may in fact be destabilising when there is a mixture of supply and
demand shocks. Calmfors and Johansson (2002), Devereux (2003), Devereux and
Siu (2004), Devereux and Yetman (2002), Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), Kiley
(2000) and Romer (1990) all analyse endogenous price ﬂexibility in one form or an-
other. Devereux and Yetman (2002) analyse the implications of endogenous price
ﬂexibility for the long run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output. Devereux and Siu
(2004), Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) and Kiley (2000) analyse the impact and
propagation of monetary shocks in models with endogenous price ﬂexibility. The
main focus of these papers is on the implications of endogenous price ﬂexibility for
business cycle behaviour. They do not directly address any implications for welfare
or the choice of monetary policy regime.
Calmfors and Johansson (2002) analyse the stabilising properties of endogenising
wage ﬂexibility for a small open economy joining a monetary union. Given that
joining a monetary union is believed to increase macroeconomic variability, a country
facing the loss of monetary independence has an incentive to increase the degree
of wage indexation. Calmfors and Johansson show, using a simple linear model
with an ad hoc quadratic welfare function, that greater variability in prices which
accompanies increased wage ﬂexibility, may in fact be welfare decreasing.
Of the papers in the existing literature, the one most closely related with the
present paper is Devereux (2003). This is the only paper to analyse the implications
of exchange rate policy for the ﬂexibility of prices in an open economy stochastic
general equilibrium model. Devereux shows that a ﬁxed rate regime followed by a
single country tends to increase the degree of price ﬂexibility within that country.1
1Devereux (2003) emphasizes the role of strategic complementarity in the incentive of price
setters to re-adjust prices ex post and shows that strategic complementarity increases the degree
2However, a ﬁxed rate regime followed by two countries (a monetary union) is shown
to reduce the degree of price ﬂexibility to a level even below that of a ﬂoating regime.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to emphasize the features of the current paper
that distinguish it from Devereux (2003). Devereux compares ﬁxed and ﬂoating
exchange rates in a single-period model where agents can choose in advance to set
prices before or after exogenous shocks are realised. The model in this paper diﬀers
from the Devereux model in three important respects. Firstly, the model presented
here is a fully dynamic framework with multi-period contracts. This implies that
the model can be more easily calibrated and matched to relevant real world data.
Secondly, the model allows the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods to diﬀer from unity (whereas Devereux restricts this elasticity to unity). The
model in the current paper can therefore be used to analyse the implications of
the expenditure switching eﬀect for the endogeneity of price ﬂexibility. Thirdly
and most importantly, the analysis below presents an explicit welfare comparison
between monetary policy regimes, whereas Devereux focuses on a purely positive
analysis. The contribution of the current paper is therefore to provide a richer
model and to analyse the implications of endogenous price ﬂexibility for the welfare
performance of regimes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model.
Section 3 describes the diﬀerent policy regimes to be compared. Section 4 dis-
cusses the solution method and approximation of the model. Section 5 analyses the
comparison between exchange rate regimes under exogenous and endogenous price
ﬂexibility, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is a variation of the sticky-price general equilibrium structure which has
become standard in the recent open economy macroeconomics literature (following
the approach developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1998)).2 As already empha-
sised, it is not the purpose of this paper to provide a deﬁnitive welfare analysis of
monetary policy regimes. For simplicity, therefore, and in order to provide a clearer
focus on the role of endogenous price ﬂexibility, the model omits some features which
have been emphasised in the literature. Thus, for instance, it is assumed that prices
are set in the currency of the producer rather than in the currency of the consumer.3
Additionally, the range of stochastic shocks disturbing the world economy is limited
of price ﬂexibility.
2See Lane (2001) for a recent survey of this literature.
3Devereux and Engel (1998, 2003) have emphasised the importance of the degree of exchange
rate pass-through for the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. Obstfeld (2002) on the
other hand shows that, if imperfect pass-through exists only at the ﬁnal goods stage, but not at
the intermediate goods stage of production, many of the results obtained in a model of producer
currency pricing continue to hold.
3to just labour supply shocks and foreign inﬂation shocks.4 Relaxing these simplify-
ing assumptions will clearly have implications for the relative welfare performance of
the diﬀerent policy regimes considered. This, however, is not the central concern of
the present paper. The objective of this paper is to determine if, given a reasonably
standard model, endogenising the degree of price ﬂexibility signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
predictions of the model for the relative welfare performance of monetary policy
regimes.
The model world consists of two countries, which will be referred to as the home
country and the foreign country. The world population is indexed on the unit interval
with home agents indexed h ∈ [0,n) and foreign agents indexed f ∈ [n,1].I nt h e
numerical exercises reported below n is chosen to be small.
The analysis focuses on the choice of monetary policy regime for the home econ-
omy. Three possible regimes are considered for the home economy. The speciﬁcation
of these regimes is described below. Throughout the analysis the foreign monetary
authority is assumed to be following a policy of strict targeting of producer-price
inﬂation.
Agents consume a basket of goods containing all home and foreign produced
goods. Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single diﬀerentiated product. Price
setting follows the Calvo (1983) structure. In any given period, agent j is allowed
to change the price of good j with probability (1 − γj).
The timing of events is as follows. In period 0 t h eh o m em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t y
makes its choice of monetary regime. Immediately following this policy decision,
all agents in both countries are allowed to make a ﬁrst choice of price for trade
in period 1 (and possibly beyond). Simultaneously, all agents are also allowed the
opportunity to make a once-and-for-all choice of Calvo-price-adjustment probability
(i.e. γj). In each subsequent period, beginning with period 1, stochastic shocks
are realised, individual agents receive their Calvo-price-adjustment signal (which is
determined by their individual choices of γ, i.e. γj), those agents which are allowed
to adjust their prices do so, and ﬁnally trade takes place.
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign
country has an identical structure (except that the foreign economy is assumed to
be large relative to the home economy). Where appropriate, foreign real variables
and foreign currency prices are indicated with an asterisk.
4Starting with the analysis of Poole (1970), it has long been recognised that the relative per-
formance of diﬀerent monetary policy regimes is inﬂuenced by the relative strength of stochastic
disturbances.
42.1 Preferences
All agents in the home economy have utility functions of the same form. The utility






















where χ is a positive constant, C is a consumption index deﬁned across all home and
foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer
price index, y (h) is the output of good h and E is the expectations operator. K is
a stochastic shock to labour supply preferences which evolves as follows
logKt = ζK logKt−1 + εK,t (2)
where εK is symmetrically distributed over the interval [− , ] with E[εK]=0and
Va r[εK]=σ2
K.
The expected costs of adjusting prices are represented by the function A(γh).
The form of this function is discussed in more detail below.











































where φ>1,c H (i) is consumption of home good i and cF (j) is consumption of
foreign good j. The parameter θ is the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods. This is a key parameter which determines the strength of the
expenditure switching eﬀect.
2.2 Price Indices

































5The law of one price is assumed to hold. This implies pH (i)=Sp∗
H (i) and
pF (j)=Sp∗
F (j) for all i and j where an asterisk indicates a price measured in
foreign currency and S is the exchange rate (deﬁned as the domestic currency price
of foreign currency). Purchasing power parity holds in terms of aggregate consumer
price indices, P = SP∗.
2.3 Financial Markets
It is assumed that international ﬁnancial trade is restricted to a risk free interna-
tional real bond which is denominated in units of the consumption basket (which is
identical in both countries).5 T h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to fa g e n th is given by
PtBt(h)+Mt(h)=( 1 + rt)ϕtPtBt−1(h)+Mt−1(h)+pH,t(h)yt(h)
−PtCt(h) − Tt + Rt(h) (7)
where B(h) is bond holdings, M(h) is money holdings, T is a lump-sum government
transfer, and P is the aggregate consumer price index.
As is standard in much of the literature, individual agents are assumed to have
access to a market for state-contingent assets which allows them to insure against
the idiosyncratic income shocks implied by the Calvo pricing structure.6 The payoﬀ
to agent h’s portfolio of state-contingent assets is given by R(h).
In order to remove the unit root which arises when international ﬁnancial trade
is restricted to non-contingent bonds, bond holdings are subject to a cost which is
related to the aggregate stock of bonds held. The holding cost is represented by the
multiplicative term ϕt in the budget constraint, where
ϕt =1 /(1 + δBt−1) (8)
and B is the aggregate holding of bonds by the home population.
Home agents can also hold wealth in the form of a home nominal bond which
is not internationally traded but which can be a substitute for the international
bond amongst home agents. Likewise, foreign agents may hold a foreign nominal
5In much of the recent open economy literature it has become standard to assume that interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets allow complete consumption risking. In many applications this approach
proves to be very simple because it eliminates the need to consider asset stock dynamics. However,
the modelling of a complete markets structure becomes much more problematic in an asymmetric
world (such as a small open economy of the type under consideration here). Any asymmetry,
either in economic structure or in policy, implies an asymmetry in the prices of state-contingent
assets. Thus, a correct analysis of a complete markets structure requires explicit modelling of
state-contingent assets and the determination of their prices. This complication can be avoided,
and thus the model can be considerably simpliﬁed, by assuming that international ﬁnancial trade
is restricted to non-contingent bonds. Of course, the distortion implied by the incompleteness of
international ﬁnancial markets has implications for the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy. This
point is further discussed below.
6There is a separate market for state-contingent assets in each country and there is no interna-
tional trade in state-contingent assets.
6bond which is also not internationally traded but which can be a substitute for the
international bond amongst foreign agents. The rate of return on the home nominal
bond will be linked to the rate of return on the international bond by the generalised
Fisher relationship as follows
















An equivalent expression holds for the foreign nominal bond.
The government’s budget constraint is
Mt − Mt−1 + Tt =0 (10)
Changes in the money supply are assumed to enter and leave the economy via
changes in lump-sum transfers.
2.4 Consumption Choices
The intertemporal dimension of home agents’ consumption choices gives rise to the













A similar condition holds for foreign agents.

























Foreign demands for home and foreign goods have an identical structure to the home
demands. Individual foreign demand for representative home good, h,a n df o r e i g n












































The total demand for home goods is Y = nCH+(1−n)C∗
H and the total demand
for foreign goods is Y ∗ = nCF +( 1− n)C∗
F.
72.5 Price Setting
In equilibrium, all home agents will choose the same value of γj, which will be
denoted by γH. The determination of γH is discussed below. Thus, in any given
period, proportion (1 − γH) of home agents are allowed to reset their prices. All
agents who set their price at time t c h o o s et h es a m ep r i c e ,d e n o t e dpH,t for the home


















where yt,s = Ys (pH,t/PH,s)
−φ is the period-s output of a home agent whose price
was last set in period t. It is possible to rewrite the expression for aggregate home













For the purposes of interpreting some of the results reported later, it proves useful
to consider the price that an individual agent would choose if prices could be reset
every period. For home agent j, this price is denoted po












2.6 Equilibrium Price Flexibility
Price ﬂexibility is made endogenous in this model by allowing all agents to make
a once-and-for-all choice of the Calvo-price-adjustment probability in period zero.7
When making decisions with regard to price ﬂexibility each agent acts as a Nash
player. Given that all agents are inﬁnitesimally small, the choice of individual γ
is made while assuming that the aggregate choice of γ is ﬁxed. The equilibrium γ
is assumed to be the Nash equilibrium value (i.e. where the individual choice of γ
coincides with the aggregate γ).
Agents make their choice of γ in order to maximise the discounted present value
of expected utility. For simplicity, it is assumed that the utility of real balances is
ignored for the purposes of determining the equilibrium value of γ.
7An alternative approach would be to assume that agents can choose a value for γ every time
they reset their prices. A structure of this form would, however, be extremely diﬃcult to solve
because it would be necessary to track the distribution of γ0s across the population of agents as
the economy evolves. The solution of the model is made much more manageable by restricting the
choice of γ to an initial once-and-for-all decision. Given that the main objective is to investigate
how the choice of γ responds to the choice of monetary regime, and given that the choice of regime
is itself a once-and-for-all decision, it seems unlikely that much is lost by restricting the choice of
γ in this way.
8From the point of view of the individual agent, the optimal γ is the one which
equates the marginal beneﬁts of price ﬂexibility with the marginal cost of price
adjustment. The beneﬁts of price ﬂexibility arise because a low value of γ implies
that the individual price can more closely respond to shocks. The costs of price
adjustment may take the form of menu costs, information costs, decision making
costs and other similar costs. These costs of price adjustment are captured by the
function A(γ) in equation (1). It is assumed that the cost of price adjustment is





(1 − γ) (19)
where α>0 and the factor 1/(1 − β) converts the per-period cost of price changes
to the present discounted value at time zero. It is important to note that the cost
of price ﬂexibility is a function of the average rate of price adjustment, and is not
linked to actual price changes.
As described above, individual agents are assumed to have access to insurance
markets which allow them to insure against the idiosyncratic income shocks implied
by the Calvo pricing structure. It is important to specify that, in the case of the
present model, these markets open after all agents have made their choices of price
adjustment probability.
3 Monetary Policy
The main focus of attention in this paper is on the choice of monetary regime for the
small home economy. The objective is to compare a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew i t h
a ﬂo a t i n ge x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e .T h es p e c i ﬁcation of a ﬁxed exchange rate is simple.
In this case, the home monetary authority is assumed to vary the home nominal
interest rate in order to maintain the exchange rate at a target rate, denoted ¯ S.
The ﬁxed rate is therefore a unilateral (or one-sided) peg in the sense that it is the
actions of the home monetary authority which sustain the regime.
While a ﬁxed-rate regime is uniquely deﬁned, there are many diﬀerent forms of
ﬂoating-rate regime which could be adopted by the home economy. Two alternatives
are considered: money targeting and strict targeting of the rate of inﬂa t i o no fp r o -
ducer prices. Money targeting is a natural case to consider because it corresponds
to the traditional ‘textbook’ deﬁnition of a ﬂoating exchange rate. Inﬂation target-
ing is also a natural case to consider because it corresponds to the policy actually
adopted by many countries in recent years.8
8In principle, it would be possible to consider other simple monetary regimes for the home
economy. Alternatives include, for instance, a Taylor rule or nominal income targeting. However,
in order to allow attention to be focused on the role of endogenous price ﬂexibility, the current
analysis is conﬁned to a comparison of money targeting, inﬂation targeting and a ﬁxed nominal
exchange rate.
9In the case of money targeting the home monetary authority ﬁxes the level of
the home money supply at a level ¯ M and allows the nominal interest rate to be
determined by equilibrium in the market for real money balances. The demand for
money is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of money holdings, which














In the case of strict targeting of producer-price inﬂation, the home monetary
authority varies the home nominal interest rate to ensure that the rate of inﬂation




In what follows, this regime will be referred to as ‘inﬂation targeting’. It should be
borne in mind, however, that this refers to targeting of producer-price inﬂation -
not consumer-price inﬂation.
It is important to emphasise that, even in the case where the degree of price
ﬂexibility is exogenously determined, none of the three policy regimes just described
is fully optimal for the home economy. In particular, it should be noted that, unlike
in the model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), a policy of inﬂation stabilisation
is not fully optimal for the home economy in this model. There are two reasons for
this: a non-unit elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods; and the
incompleteness of international ﬁnancial markets. Sutherland (2004) shows that, in
general, producer-price stabilisation is not optimal (for a small open economy) when
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods diﬀers from unity,9 and
Devereux (2004) and Benigno (2001) show that price or inﬂation stabilisation is not
optimal when international ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. Given these factors,
there is no reason to suppose, ap r i o r i ,t h a ti n ﬂation targeting will dominate the
other two regimes.
In principle, it would be possible to derive fully optimal monetary policy rules
for the home economy. However, the complications caused by endogenous price ﬂex-
ibility make this infeasible given currently available solution techniques. Attention
is therefore conﬁned to a comparison of the three simple, but non-optimal, policy
regimes speciﬁed above.
Finally, it is necessary to specify the behaviour of the foreign monetary authority.
The foreign monetary authority is assumed to adopt a rule for the foreign nominal
9It is important to note that, even when price stability is optimal from the point of view of a
global cooperative policymaker, it is not necessarily optimal for an individual country acting to
maximise national welfare. Benigno and Benigno (2003) study the conditions under which price
stability is optimal for cooperative and non-cooperative policymaking in a two-country model where
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods can diﬀer from unity.










As with many other aspects of the model, the policy rule adopted by the foreign
monetary authority can aﬀect the welfare comparison between monetary regimes
for the home economy. An inﬂation targeting policy is a natural benchmark for the
foreign economy because such a policy is, in fact, optimal from the point of view
of foreign welfare.10 It is also a reasonable approximation to the monetary policy
operated by large economies such as the United States and those of the Eurozone
countries.
The inﬂation target in the foreign country is assumed to be subject to stochastic
shocks such that π∗
t e v o l v e sa sf o l l o w s
logπ
∗
t = ζπ∗ logπ
∗
t−1 + επ∗,t (23)
where επ∗ is symmetrically distributed over the interval [− , ] with E[επ∗]=0
and Va r[επ∗]=σ2
π∗. The stochastic shocks to the foreign inﬂation target represent
exogenous changes in policy which may arise from changes in political pressure on
the foreign monetary authority or changes in the composition of its governing council
or policymaking committee. Alternatively the shocks may represent policy mistakes
made by the foreign monetary authority. In either case, the shocks are exogenous
from the point of view of the home country. In the context of the current model,
these shocks represent a form of foreign monetary shock.
4M o d e l S o l u t i o n
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. The
model is therefore approximated around a non-stochastic equilibrium (deﬁned as
the solution which results when K = K∗ = π∗ =1and σ2
K = σ2
K∗ = σ2
π∗ =0 ) .F o r




where ¯ X is the value of variable X in the
non-stochastic equilibrium. ˆ X is therefore the log-deviation of X from its value in
the non-stochastic equilibrium.



























(1 − γ) (24)
where, for simplicity, the utility of real balances is excluded.
10In all the results presented below, the foreign economy is assumed to be so large that, in
eﬀect, it is a closed economy. The factors which undermine the optimality of inﬂation targeting
for the home economy (i.e. incomplete international ﬁnancial markets and the non-unit elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods) therefore do not apply to the foreign economy.
11A second-order approximation of Ω c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s












































ˆ pH,s−i − ˆ PH,s
´2
(26)
where O( 3) contains terms of order higher than two in the variables of the model.11
In order to derive a solution to the endogenous price ﬂexibility problem it is also
necessary to consider the utility of a representative individual agent. A second-order
approximation of period-0 utility of agent h is



































Note that the second-order approximations of both aggregate and individual util-
ities depend on the ﬁrst and second moments of consumption and output. Aggregate
utility also depends on the second moments of prices. In order to analyse aggre-
gate and individual utility it is necessary to derive second-order accurate solutions
for the ﬁrst moments of the variables of the model. These solutions are obtained
numerically using the technique described in Sutherland (2002).
A numerical search technique is used to locate Nash equilibria in the choice of
γ. The procedure is as follows. An initial guess for the equilibrium γ is selected.
The model is then solved for this value of γ and the discounted value of utility for
an individual agent is calculated (using the expression for individual utility given
in (27)). The model is then re-solved with a perturbed value of γh for a single
individual, but with the value of γ for all other agents ﬁxed. The discounted value
of utility for individual h is then re-evaluated at this perturbed value of γh. This
provides a measure of the incentive for individual h to deviate from the aggregate γ.
If this incentive is non-zero, the procedure is repeated with a new choice of aggregate
11All log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of the same order as the shocks,
which (by assumption) are of maximum size  . When presenting an equation which is approximated





12γ.The procedure is repeated until a value of γ is found where the incentive to deviate
is zero - in which case a Nash equilibrium has been identiﬁed.
In all the examples considered below, the foreign country is large relative to the
home country, so the foreign equilibrium value of γ does not depend on the home
value of γ. The foreign γ is also invariant to the choice of monetary regime in the
home country and to the value of θ (the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods). On the other hand, the equilibrium value of γ for the home economy
depends on the choice of regime and the value of θ. The search procedure for the
home economy must therefore be repeated for each policy regime and each value of
θ.
The next section reports numerical solutions to the above model which allow
a comparison to be made between the three monetary regimes. The numerical
solutions are obtained using the set of parameter values in Table 1. The values for
ρ, φ, µ and β are taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). The value for δ (i.e.
the parameter determining the costs of bond holdings) is based on the calibration
used by Benigno (2001).
We consider a range of values of θ (i.e. the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods) between 1 and 10.12 The empirical literature on the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods does not provide any clear guidance
on an appropriate value for this parameter. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) brieﬂy
survey some of the relevant literature and quote estimates for the elasticity ranging
between 1.2 and 21.4 for individual goods (see Treﬂer and Lai (1999)). Estimates
for the average elasticity across all traded goods lie in the range 5 to 6 (see for
instance Hummels (2001)). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) also survey the
empirical literature on trade elasticities and conclude that a value between 5 and 10
is reasonable. On the other hand, the real business cycle literature typically uses a
much smaller value for this parameter. For instance Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2002) use a value of 1.5 in their analysis.
In addition to the lack of ﬁrm empirical guidance on values for θ, there are good
theoretical reasons to consider a range of values for this parameter. In a previous
paper (Senay and Sutherland (2004)), using a model where the degree of price
ﬂexibility is exogenously determined, it was shown that the expenditure switching
eﬀect can play a signiﬁcant role in the welfare comparison between regimes. It
was found that the key mechanism which drives the relative welfare performances
of ﬁxed and ﬂoating regimes is the impact of regime choice on the volatility of
output. The volatility of output is particularly sensitive to the choice of exchange
rate regime when the expenditure switching eﬀect is strong. Given that the volatility
of output is likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on the incentive of agents to choose
12In principle θ can be less than unity. Sutherland (2004), using a model with an exogenously
ﬁx e dd e g r e eo fp r i c eﬂexibility, analyses the case where θ is less than unity and shows that many
of the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy are reversed in this region. The theoretical complications
that arise when θ is less than unity are not directly relevant to the subject of the current paper,
so attention is conﬁned to values of θ greater than unity. In addition, the bulk of the empirical
evidence suggests that this is the relevant range.
13ah i g hd e g r e eo fp r i c eﬂexibility, there may be an important interaction between
the expenditure switching eﬀect, the degree of price ﬂexibility and the choice of
exchange rate regime. The results reported below show that this interaction is
indeed potentially important.
Of all the parameters of the model, the most diﬃcult to calibrate is α, i.e.
the coeﬃcient in the function determining the costs of price adjustment (equation
19). The function A(γ) in principle captures a wide range of costs associated with
price adjustment. Not all these costs are directly measurable, so there is no simple
empirical basis on which to select a value for α. A sas t a r t i n gp o i n t ,f o rt h ep u r p o s e s
of illustration, the value of α is set at 0.003 in the benchmark case. This implies
aggregate price adjustment costs of 0.075 per cent of GDP if prices are adjusted at
an average rate of once every four quarters (which is consistent with γ =0 .75). This
total aggregate cost is not implausibly high, given the potentially wide range of costs
incorporated in A(γ), but it is acknowledged that a more satisfactory basis needs to
be found for calibrating α. In order to test the sensitivity of the main results, the
implications of setting α to 0.004 are also brieﬂy considered.
The numerical solutions to the model are presented in Figures 1 to 7. Figure
1 shows the equilibrium value of γ for each regime for a range of values of θ.I n
order to understand the results, it is useful to compare the eﬀects of endogenous
price ﬂexibility with a version of the model where the degree of price ﬂexibility is
ﬁxed exogenously. Figures 2 to 7 therefore show this comparison. In each ﬁgure
the left-hand panel shows results for exogenous price ﬂexibility (where γ is ﬁxed at
0.75) for a range of values of θ and the right-hand panel shows results for endogenous
price ﬂexibility for the same range of values for θ. Figure 2 shows results for welfare.
Figures 3 to 7 show the volatilities of a number of relevant variables.
Discount factor β =0 .99
Elasticity of substitution for individual goods φ =7 .66
Work eﬀort preference parameter µ =1 .47
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ρ =1
Bond holding costs δ =0 .0005
Price adjustment costs α =0 .003
Labour supply shocks ζK = ζK∗ =0 .9,σ K = σK∗ =0 .01
Foreign inﬂation shocks ζπ∗ =0 .9,σ π∗ =0 .001
Home country size n =0 .001
Table 1: Parameter Values
145 Comparison of Exchange Rate Regimes
5.1 Exogenous Price Flexibility
The comparison between the three monetary regimes is ﬁr s tc o n s i d e r e di nt h ec a s e
where price ﬂexibility is exogenously determined (with γ =0 .75). Figure 2(a) shows
the welfare comparison between regimes. In this ﬁgure (and all other ﬁgures showing
welfare comparisons), welfare is measured in terms of the equivalent compensating
percentage variation in steady state consumption. There are two features of Figure
2(a) which are worth noting.
First, inﬂation targeting yields the highest welfare for values of θ greater than
unity. As already emphasised, a number of features of the model imply that fully
optimal monetary policy will generate some volatility in the producer price index.
Inﬂation stabilisation is therefore not fully optimal and there is no ap r i o r ireason to
suppose that inﬂation targeting should be the best of the three regimes considered
here. Nevertheless it is clear that, for the calibration illustrated and for values of θ
greater than unity, inﬂation targeting is closer to the fully optimal policy than either
of the other policy regimes considered. Thus, the presence of incomplete ﬁnancial
markets and a relatively powerful expenditure switching eﬀe c ta r en o ts u ﬃcient
to make either of the other two regimes better than inﬂation targeting (for the
parameter range considered).
The second feature of the welfare comparison in Figure 2(a) which should be
noted is that a ﬁxed exchange rate yields relatively low welfare for low values of
θ, but it can yield higher welfare than money targeting for higher values of θ. The
welfare performance of money targeting declines quite sharply for high values of θ.
This is because money targeting causes high volatility of output for high values of θ
- as can be seen in Figure 3(a). This, in turn, is caused by relatively high volatility
in the terms of trade for high values of θ - as shown in Figure 6(a). High volatility
of output has a negative eﬀect on welfare (as can be seen from the approximated
welfare measure given in equation (25)). These eﬀects are similar to those identiﬁed
in Senay and Sutherland (2004).
5.2 Endogenous Price Flexibility
Now consider the implications of endogenising the degree of price ﬂexibility. Recall
that the degree of price ﬂexibility is determined by the parameter γ.L o wv a l u e so f
γ imply very ﬂexible prices, while values of γ close to unity imply very rigid prices.
The equilibrium degree of price ﬂexibility depends on the interaction between many
diﬀerent factors. At the micro level, γ is determined by the balance between the
beneﬁts and costs of price adjustment. At this level, from the point of view of the
individual agent, the beneﬁts of price ﬂexibility will be aﬀected by factors such as
the volatility of output, consumption and prices, as well as the covariances between
these variables. In turn, at the macro level, the volatilities of these variables will be
aﬀected by the aggregate degree of price ﬂexibility itself. Thus, the value of γ will be
15determined as part of the general equilibrium interaction of all these diﬀerent factors.
Furthermore, the equilibrium will be aﬀected by strategic interaction between agents
in their individual choices of γ’s. It is likely that there is a strong degree of strategic
complementarity between agents in their choice of γ - i.e. an individual agent’s
choice of γ will be positively related to the aggregate choice of γ.
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium values of γ for the home country for a range of
values of θ. There are three features of this ﬁgure which should be noted. First,
the equilibrium value of γ in the inﬂation targeting regime is unity. Second, money
targeting leads to a negative relationship between γ and θ, with relatively low values
of equilibrium γ for high values of θ. And third, the ﬁxed exchange rate leads to a
positive relationship between γ and θ, with relatively low values of equilibrium γ for
low values of θ. (Notice also that, for some ranges of θ, money targeting gives rise
to corner solutions, where the equilibrium value of γ is unity.)
Despite the potentially complex interactions which determine the equilibrium
γ, it is possible to gain some insight into the mechanisms at work by considering
the volatilities of some of the main macro variables shown in Figures 3 to 7. In
particular, consider the optimal price (po
H,t), or, more speciﬁcally, consider the gap
between the optimal price and the actual price level. This ‘price gap’ is the diﬀerence
between the price that agents would like to set if it was possible to reset prices every
period and the average price actually set. The volatility of the ‘price gap’ is plotted
in Figure 5(a). When this price gap is very volatile in the exogenous-price-ﬂexibility
case it indicates a strong (latent) incentive to vary prices. Conversely, when the
price gap is very stable there is little incentive to vary prices. Thus, for the inﬂation
targeting regime, Figure 5(a) shows that the price gap is completely stable. There is
thus no pressure for agents to choose a high degree of price ﬂexibility in this regime.
This explains why the equilibrium γ in the inﬂation targeting case is unity (as shown
in Figure 1). The equilibrium γ’s in the other monetary regimes are also inversely
related to the volatility of the price gap. Money targeting causes high volatility of
t h ep r i c eg a pa th i g hv a l u e so fθ and this translates into a low equilibrium value of
γ (as shown in Figure 1), while the ﬁxed rate regime causes a high volatility of the
price gap at low values of θ and this likewise leads to a low equilibrium value of γ.
The behaviour of the price gap can, in turn, be traced to the behaviour of other
variables. In the case of money targeting, the most important variable appears
to be output. As previously explained, with exogenous price ﬂexibility, at high
values of θ, output is very volatile in the money targeting regime (see Figure 3(a)).
Equation (18) shows that output is one of the main determinants of the optimal
price, hence high output volatility leads to high volatility of the optimal price and
high volatility of the price gap. This creates a strong incentive to choose a low value
of γ. Notice from Figure 3(b) that, in the endogenous-price-ﬂexibility case, the extra
price ﬂexibility induced by the money targeting regime at high values of θ leads to
more stable output compared to the exogenous-price-ﬂexibility case.
It is important to note that, while money targeting creates excessive output
volatility at high values of θ, agents do not desire completely to stabilise output. A
16positive K shock implies that home agents would prefer to work less. Thus agents
would like output to be negatively correlated with K. The foreign labour supply
shocks and inﬂation shocks (by causing ﬂuctuations in the demand for home goods)
also create changes in the desired output levels of home agents. For these reasons, a
more accurate impression of the degree of excess volatility of output can be obtained
by considering the ‘output gap’, i.e. the diﬀerence between actual output and the
level of output in a ﬂexible price equilibrium. The volatility of the output gap is
shown in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) shows that in the exogenous-price-ﬂexibility case, as
with the absolute output level, money targeting creates high volatility of the output
gap for high values of θ. Figure 4(b) shows that the extra price ﬂexibility induced
by the money targeting regime at high levels of θ leads to a more stable output gap.
Notice from Figure 4(a) that the inﬂation targeting regime perfectly replicates
the ﬂexible price equilibrium and thus perfectly stabilises the output gap.
The explanation for the relatively low equilibrium value of γ in the ﬁxed rate
regime, shown in Figure 1, is also related to the behaviour of the output gap. The
important mechanism here is the impact of the ﬁxed nominal exchange rate on
m o v e m e n t si nt h et e r m so ft r a d e . Aﬁxed nominal exchange rate combined with
sticky nominal prices tends to suppress movements in the terms of trade (as can
be seen in Figure 6(a)). This, in turn, tends to prevent output from responding
appropriately to the labour supply shocks. There is thus an incentive to adjust
prices in order to generate the required movement in the terms of trade. This
translates into a low equilibrium value of γ in the endogenous-price-ﬂexibility case.
This eﬀect is strongest at low values of θ because the terms of trade movements
necessary to produce the required movement in output are larger when θ is small
(because the expenditure switching is relatively weak in this case).
The results just described for the ﬁxed rate regime are consistent with the pol-
icy argument described in the introduction to the paper, namely that a ﬁxed rate
regime, such as the European monetary union, may lead to greater price ﬂexibility,
which, in turn, may oﬀset the negative welfare eﬀect of the loss of monetary policy
independence.
Having constructed a model which generates an increase in price ﬂexibility in
a ﬁxed rate regime, the crucial question which must now be considered is whether
t h ei n c r e a s ei np r i c eﬂexibility leads to an improvement in the welfare performance
of the ﬁxed rate regime. This question can be addressed by considering Figure
2(b). This ﬁgure shows the welfare comparison between regimes in the endogenous-
price-ﬂexibility case. It is immediately apparent from this ﬁgure that endogenous
price ﬂexibility makes little diﬀerence to the ﬁrst-ranked policy regime, i.e. inﬂation
targeting continues to yield the highest level of welfare of the three regimes for values
of θ greater than unity.
Despite the continued welfare superiority of inﬂation targeting, endogenous price
ﬂexibility does lead to a number of changes to the welfare performance of the other
two regimes which are worth highlighting. Firstly, the extra price ﬂexibility induced
by money targeting at high levels of θ leads to a reduction in the level of welfare
17when compared to the exogenous-price-ﬂexibility case (see Figures 2(a) and 2(b)).
The greater price ﬂexibility induced by money targeting does lead to lower output
volatility for high levels of θ (as can be seen from a comparison between Figures 3(a)
and 3(b)). This reduction in output volatility does have a positive welfare eﬀect.
B u tt h i si sm o r et h a no ﬀset by the greater costs of price adjustment which are
incurred when the equilibrium value of γ is low. The negative welfare eﬀect of price
ﬂexibility is suﬃciently strong to imply that the welfare ranking of money targeting
relative to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime is reversed for values of θ (approximately)
in the range 7 <θ<9.
Figure 2(b) also shows that the extra price ﬂexibility generated by the ﬁxed
exchange rate at low values of θ reduces the welfare yielded by the ﬁxed rate. The
extra price ﬂexibility induced by the ﬁxed rate does lead to more variability in the
terms of trade (as can be seen from a comparison of Figures 6(a) and 6(b)). This
has a positive welfare eﬀect because the terms of trade can now respond more easily
to labour supply shocks. But this welfare beneﬁti sm o r et h a no ﬀset by the extra
costs of price ﬂexibility arising from the low value of γ. The net result is that the
ﬁxed exchange rate is signiﬁcantly worse than both money targeting and inﬂation
targeting at low values of θ.
Thus, for both the ﬁxed rate regime (at low values of θ) and the money targeting
regime (at high values of θ) extra price ﬂexibility appears to have a negative impact
on welfare. At ﬁrst sight this may appear surprising. After all, given that agents are
individually choosing the degree of price ﬂexibility in order to maximise individual
utility, why do agents end up choosing a level of price ﬂexibility which yields lower
aggregate utility? The explanation is that, in their individual choices of price ﬂex-
ibility, agents are acting non-cooperatively. Furthermore, there is a strong degree
of strategic complementarity in the choice of price ﬂexibility which implies that the
Nash equilibrium value of γ is likely to be very diﬀerent from the socially optimal
γ. In the cases considered here, it appears that the Nash equilibrium in the choice
of γ results in excessively low values of γ. Thus the welfare beneﬁts of greater price
ﬂexibility are outweighed by the high costs of price ﬂexibility.
The results in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) can now be used to address the two questions
outlined in the introduction to this paper. The ﬁrst question related to the impact
of endogenous price ﬂexibility on the welfare ranking of regimes. Figures 2(a) and
2(b) show that, while the ﬁrst ranked regime is unchanged, there is a change in
the welfare ranking of the ﬁxed rate and money targeting regimes for values of θ in
the range 7 <θ<9. The second question related to the proposition that a ﬁxed
exchange rate may create suﬃcient price ﬂexibility to oﬀset the loss of monetary
independence. The results in Figure 1, 2(a) and 2(b) show that, while a ﬁxed rate
does lead to greater price ﬂexibility at low values of θ, this has an overall negative
impact on welfare. Greater price ﬂexibility therefore does not compensate for the
loss of monetary independence.
Before concluding, it is necessary brieﬂy to consider the extent to which the
results just described are sensitive to variations in the parameters of the model. Two
18parameters are likely to be particularly important. One is α, which determines the
costs of price ﬂexibility (in equation 19). The other is φ, the elasticity of substitution
between individual goods. The role of α is obvious: the more costly it is to have
ﬂexible prices, the less the degree of price ﬂexibility will change in response to
ac h a n g ei nm o n e t a r yr e g i m e . T h er o l eo fφ is more subtle. The parameter φ
determines the price elasticity of demand for individual goods, (see equations (12)
and (14)). Thus, when φ is large, any increase in the degree of aggregate price
ﬂexibility, which is accompanied by an increase in aggregate price volatility, will
generate a strong eﬀect on the volatility of output for an individual agent. The
presence of high aggregate price ﬂexibility therefore creates a strong incentive for
the individual agent also to choose a high degree of price ﬂexibility. Thus, a high
value of φ implies a high degree of strategic complementarity between agents in their
choice of price ﬂexibility.
Figures 8 and 9 show the implications of a higher value of α. For these ﬁgures
α is set at 0.004 (which implies aggregate price adjustment costs of 0.1 per cent of
GDP if prices are adjusted at an average rate of once every four quarters). Figure
8 shows the resulting equilibrium values of γ for the three monetary regimes. It is
clear that the same general pattern of results emerges, except that the values of the
equilibrium γ’s are higher than in the benchmark case. Figure 9 shows the welfare
comparison (where again the left panel shows the case of exogenous price ﬂexibility
and the right panel shows the case of endogenous price ﬂexibility). The qualitative
pattern of the welfare comparison is very similar to the benchmark case.
Figures 10 and 11 show the implications of a lower value of φ. For these ﬁgures φ is
set at 4.0. As explained above, this reduces the degree of strategic complementarity
between agents in their choices of γ. This implies that the equilibrium value of γ
should be less sensitive to a change in monetary regime. This is conﬁrmed in Figure
10. The qualitative pattern of the welfare comparison (shown in Figure 11) is again
broadly similar to the benchmark case.
6C o n c l u d i n g C o m m e n t s
This paper has analysed the implications of endogenous price ﬂexibility in a general
equilibrium model where agents may choose the frequency of price changes. The
welfare eﬀects of three policy regimes are compared under both exogenous and en-
dogenous determination of price ﬂexibility. The introduction to the paper outlined
two reasons for considering these issues. One was related to the Lucas critique, i.e.
does a change in policy regime lead to an endogenous change in price ﬂexibility which
alters the welfare performance of regimes? The second was a more policy related
question, namely, does a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t eg e n e r a t es u ﬃcient price ﬂexibility to
oﬀset the welfare cost of the loss of monetary independence? The results described
above appear to conﬁrm that endogenous price ﬂexibility can lead to a signiﬁcant
change in the welfare performance of regimes. In one case these changes can change
the welfare ranking of regimes. On the other hand, while a ﬁxed exchange rate does
19generate more ﬂexible prices, this extra price ﬂexibility does not compensate for the
loss of monetary independence. In fact, when a monetary regime generates more
price ﬂexibility, the overall impact on welfare appears to be negative.
Clearly, the results presented above are potentially highly dependent on the
form of the model and the speciﬁc parameterisation used. A much more extensive
sensitivity analysis is required before ﬁrmer conclusions can be drawn. The analysis
has shown that the equilibrium degree of price ﬂexibility is potentially sensitive to
the choice of regime, the costs of price adjustment and strategic complementarity
eﬀects (see Figures 1, 8 and 10). A simple linear function is used to model the costs
of price ﬂexibility. Given the potentially important role played by the costs of price
ﬂexibility, experimentation with other functional forms for this cost function is a
priority. The determinants of the degree of strategic complementarity in the choice
of price ﬂexibility also require further investigation.
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Fig 1: Equilibrium degree of price stickiness (α=0.003 φ=7.66)Fig 2: Welfare (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
Fig 3: Standard Deviation of Output (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
Fig 4: Standard Deviation of the Output Gap (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
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(b) Endogenous Price FlexibilityFig 5: Standard Deviation of the Price Gap (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
Fig 6: Standard Deviation of the Terms of Trade (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
Fig 7: Standard Deviation of Producer Price Inflation (α=0.003 φ=7.66)
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(b) Endogenous Price FlexibilityFig 9: Welfare (α=0.004 φ=7.66)
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Fig 8: Equilibrium degree of price stickiness (α=0.004 φ=7.66)
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(b) Endogenous Price FlexibilityFig 11: Welfare (α=0.003 φ=4.00)
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Fig 10: Equilibrium degree of price stickiness (α=0.003 φ=4.00)
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